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EXCERPT

CHAPTER I. LANGUAGE AND CONCEPTS

Section 1. The signification of language (approximately first half of section)

The presence of language in man’s pursuit of knowledge is critical, since language is almost the only form in which all known, as well as conceived, is set down and communicated. Accordingly words are often viewed as inherently standing for certain entities, and it is endeavored to discover what the entity represented by a given word is.

What constitutes life, for example, is a matter of appreciable debate; as an illustration, the Encyclopedia Britannica offers five alternative and protracted definitions. As another example, light has been progressively redefined, in the confidence that it is in the process described more accurately; instead of for instance defining it as, initially understood, visual sensation, it would be defined as electromagnetic radiation of wavelengths beginning and ending with, in contradiction of the first meaning, invisible ultraviolet and infrared.

Language as used by man does not presume undiscovered meanings, however, which man is to investigate. Language is by definition, as would be said and in conformance with the beginning of this chapter, a form of conveyance of things in the awareness of man, who thereby assigns the meaning to the words.

The preceding statement, as can any other, may afford the first occasion for disputation in the body of this treatise. What linguistic expressions are about or mean is a matter of extensive theory, known as semantics. Notwithstanding a frequent acknowledgment that the meaning of words is decided by its users, it is maintained that it has a more remote inception. It is likened to government, which likewise may have a more obscure beginning than a sometimes supposed social contract. However, the origin of a meaning is not relevant, as need not be the origin of a government. Men do agree or not to use the meaning, or to abide by the form of government.

As was indicated in the introduction, of account herein with regard to language is that the inquiry centers on entities however worded, not, in a linguistic study, on the words. That is to say, what is herein of account is not the initial meaning of the language used, nor what other meaning it might have, but what is wished to be expressed by it. It is here thus dependent on agreement or decision what the words mean. The same can be taken to be the case in regard to the customary philosophical or comparable search for the meaning of expressions. The search is not for the meaning of words as used by someone else, in which case the issue might be considered a linguistic inquiry into a foreign or obsolete language. The search is for the meaning of words as used by the inquirers themselves, as happens with “life” as used by physiologists, or “light” as used by physicists. In that event, however, the inquirers know the meaning, which is the one intended by them.

The truth of this inference, as of any, would still be challenged, and a frequent query concerns the understanding of language as conveyor of things in man’s awareness, in man’s consciousness. The contention is that, at one extreme, abstract words like “and” and, at another extreme, concrete words like “chair” do not designate things residing in consciousness, aside from the mentioned view that there is no consciousness. It was also mentioned that all things are of recognition by being of consciousness, which is to say more generally that anything that might be considered, be it something merely contemplated or of a determination like a decision or discovery, is so by manifestation in consciousness. Thus an abstract word like “and”, although not designating an independent entity, is represented conceptually by the presence of more than one thing in some circumstance, and a concrete word like “chair”, although designating an object viewed as separate from the perception of it, is represented conceptually by that perception. The words are used to designate those entities in accordance with those conceptual representations. The representations in awareness need not even be what are held to be direct perceptions of the objects. The objects one speaks of may only be thought of, and in the case of hypothetical ones they furthermore need not exist although the words used for them, not referring to the thought of them, would refer only to existing ones. What matters is that one has a conception, perhaps indirectly, of the thing referred to, rather than be using words empty of such content.

This issue is not the present one, however, which is the awareness that certain words stand for certain things, rather than the awareness of those things. It is similarly beside the point to question whether that awareness of what the words mean can be said to be knowledge. That the users of words have knowledge of what they mean was asserted in the above inference, and inasmuch as previous to it only such as consent to the meaning by the users was spoken of, it might be argued that its knowledge is not the consequence. The argument may be advanced because of the alluded to belief that knowledge can only be acquired through sense experience. It concerns the synthetic connections spoken of contrasted with analytic ones and held alone to comprise facts, compared to the supposed definitional truth of the other. Someone therefore may propose that definitions do not constitute knowledge, and that as a result the above determination does not hold. But as suggested regarding statements supposed meaningless or neither true nor false, a decision over language, presently whether something may be termed knowledge, does not dispose of underlying matters. The users of a language were said above to know their meaning, because their understood awareness of it is normally referred to as knowledge. And it may be specified here correspondingly that by knowledge of a meaning is meant awareness of it, however the awareness be obtained, as by one’s own definition. It may be remarked that by awareness and hence knowledge is not here meant present consciousness alone of a thing, but its mentioned being sometime considered, in the sense that it may be stored in memory. And the question is whether the users of a language do in this sense not know their meaning, accordingly seeking it, or whether they do.

The affirmative reply should by the foregoing be obvious, the knowledge consisting in the very having decided the use, and it should be observed that the inference is made about other persons by inadvertent induction. The elucidation of how the induction is made can be postponed, however, because the comprehension altogether of this writing, as of writings or other communications by others, presupposes, is proof, that the induction has been performed. It has been learned that others convey meanings through language in the manner oneself does. As a matter of fact, since a form of language is generally not devised by oneself, one uses it in that manner because one learns that that is the usage by others.

This writer thus has likewise induced that language is used in this manner by others, and the induction of understandings held in common extends farther. It concerns also observations herein that are made through language as a conveyor, observations which were noted to be of basic matters in man’s life. The observations can be of the mentioned educed entities themselves which man has cognition of, as well as of the inferred facts about them as brought out in this treatise. In all of this is implicit of course that the induction as pertains to language is not only that it is used by men alike for conveyance of their meanings, but that particular meanings are likewise held in common.

All particular meanings, it is clear, need not be understood by every speaker of the language. Language is an inconstant thing, differing not only with communities, but with individuals. Of pertinence at present is that while the hearer of the words of a language need in instances be informed of their meaning, the user need not, but knows it.

The recognition of this knowledge can be of estimable value to thinkers, since a corresponding calling forth of what entity is named provides a basis for further knowledge about it. The like took place in inferring that since consciousness is meant to extend to all objects of man’s consideration, all meanings man considers for words are of consciousness. The recognition that a meaning is known can also dissuade from supposing a different one, to thereby wrongly infer a fact about, ironically, the originally meant. Such inference, committing the fallacy of equivocation, takes place in the frequent argument that if the self is held to include the body then the destruction of one’s body is the destruction of oneself, although the self first meant with respect to immortality is one dissociated from the body.

The presence of knowledge of the meaning of the words man uses does not imply that a verbal definition, or even a suitable education in thought alone, is an easy task if not a prohibitive one. One often thinks of only familiar instances of what is named, and as with other knowledge a taxing of memory may be required. The knowledge, however, does imply that the search for knowledge of various fundamental entities, which has been a concern of philosophy, is misconceived. It has been continually sought to find what entities like virtue are, with volumes sometimes devoted to the questions, without cognizance that, insofar as the concern is not with an unfamiliar language, what the names refer to is known to the seekers in accordance with their sometime decision.

These mistaken searches for knowledge already possessed are perpetuated among leading schools by phenomenology and analytic philosophy, in their main enterprises of investigating essences or concepts. It is the investigation mentioned in the introduction as having replaced former ones in philosophy, so as to furnish information for others elsewhere. But in concord with observations in the same place and by the above, possession of that information belongs to the understandings presupposed in science as in all human activity making use of language.

Accordingly, as regards linguistic meaning the formulation of theory is not only not required, similarly to the situation in logic, but is misplaced. In deduction, though conclusive answers may be reflectively available, they may be difficult to attain and theory a substitute. But what the meaning of words is has been determined, and theory but infringes on it.

Be determinations dependent thus on definition or on other factors, once any have been appropriately made they cannot, lest engaging in contradiction again, be controverted by argument. It, assuredly, has been, as remarked of Socrates, put forward that man possesses what is called a priori knowledge, knowledge that precedes any determination. It is contrasted with a posteriori knowledge, knowledge derived from experience, and it should be explained that it is meant here in the sense in which it excludes any finding, physical or reflective. Thus certain logical principles are held to be known without confirmation. But something proposed to be true, as would be a theory in any field, becomes admittedly known to be true only if found to be so.

The preceding speaks again of knowledge, but with respect to more than meaning, and its implied definition as including a certainty would be questioned. It would be maintained that the knowledge one has before findings need not have the certainty attached to things afterward. But the issue is exactly the certainty that can be attached to things. By knowledge here is meant, as can be held to be common, the complete certainty connected with having determined that something is the case. Otherwise a fact would not be held known but merely perhaps quite certain. In other words, in following through from the definition of knowledge of a meaning, by knowledge in an inclusive sense is meant now awareness of something actual, whatever the form by which something is meant to be so, instead of awareness of something assumed, however probable. Among the assumed things are meant to be beliefs, which accordingly, howsoever infused with conviction, fall short of knowledge. The definition of knowledge as justified true belief, frequent in philosophy, is accordingly inadequate. Objections to it were that it is not apparent what makes a belief justified. But the justification can be characterized independently, by again the particular way by which something is meant ascertained. Justification for a belief only, however, is insufficient because of the very limitation of the meaning of belief, even if the believed is true.

In the light of the foregoing it should upon appropriate demonstration of something not be required to address opposing arguments. If therefore such arguments are in this exposition periodically surveyed it is because they may be well known or their discussion instructive. In the one case the inaccuracies may not be discerned, with men laboring under misapprehensions, and in the other case additional observations can be made, supplementing primary ones.

With reference, correspondingly, to linguistic meaning, theories dealing with it as a whole tend not to investigate the meaning of individual expressions, but what sort of things are meant by them in general. Proposals on individual meanings will in this treatise in the main be considered when they come into question. As to what sort of things are meant by words in general, any attempt to particularize those things, since they are up to the speakers, is as misapplied as are theories about individual meanings. The issue has been moreover confounded with the question of what is sometimes phrased as the meaning of meaning. It is a question concerning an individual word again, rather than words in general.

The phrase “meaning of meaning” is of course begging the question, since, contrary to the intimation, if what “meaning” stands for is not known at the end of the phrase, it is not known at its start, the purport of the whole not understood. But the question being, using here a presumably understood synonym, what “meaning” stands for, the situation is such that, in asserting to try to know what words in general mean, one cannot make up one’s mind about what one wishes to say by “mean” or other words used in the process.

Furthermore, in the questioning of particular expressions, less accustomed ones are often substituted for them, forgetting that since unusual, they are more difficult yet to comprehend. In place of thus asking “What does this word mean?” it is asked “What is it to say this word?”, and the second question is evidently the one unclear to the usual hearer. Rather than responding to it with a definition as customarily desired, one might try to assist in pronunciation. How by replacing in these attempts other words as well beside “mean” language is, contrary to intention, not clarified but obfuscated, is illustrated with respect to speaking of a person as “one”, as done at the end of the preceding paragraph. The notion being that the second and third use of the word in a like sentence can be taken to speak of someone other than the first does, thinkers would replace them by “his” and “he”. But by usage the interpretation is the opposite. The substitutions signify thus a reading into words meanings at odds with those agreed to.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

(See his own web site at http://vjecsner.net.) The author is a Holocaust survivor who emigrated to the United States in 1948. He made his living primarily in applied art, because of his interest in art since childhood. For the same reason he did not feel it at first of benefit to educate himself to a substantial degree in other subjects, not to take into account that he was prevented from such endeavors by the need to support himself. But he managed to for some time (1950-52) attend evening classes at the Cooper Union School of Art and Architecture, which instead of tuition required an entrance exam.

There was also, however, a lifelong interest in other intellectual pursuits, although he did not carry it in earlier years to the length of being productive in them. The situation changed somewhat when he found himself to possess the reasoning prowess that enabled solutions to problems dealt with unsuccessfully by others. He applied the ability at one point toward inventing ways by which containers made of paper or paperboard can be securely closed without use of adhesives or other extraneous material. He was granted three U.S. patents (Nos. 3545667, 3788539 and 3908889) on these, and an article about some of this appeared in the monthly Paperboard Packaging (September 1974).

A corresponding interest in mathematics made him venture for a while into prime numbers, on which were published two papers of his in the New York State Mathematics Teachers' Journal (May 1976) and The New Jersey Mathematics Teacher (Winter 1977). Inasmuch as his interests expanded in the direction of knowledge in general, he subsequently turned to basic philosophical and other problems, in which he saw himself forced to depart from much of the status quo. He accordingly set about to organize his so far attained particular findings—and ultimate ones they led to—into the present volume.

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