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Matthew Lee

Predatory Bender:
A Story of Subprime Finance

The non-fiction advocates' afterward:

Predatory Lending:
Toxic Credit in the Inner City

Predatory Bender

Toxic Credit in the Global Inner City

 Jack in The Bronx

            The West Farms Mall was built in the former South Bronx in the second year of the new millennium.  While ostensibly the fruit of three decades of community struggle, the land beneath the mall was owned by Anguilla-based EmpiBank.  The anchor tenant, too, was a part of Empi's empire: a storefront office of the high-rate lender EmpiFinancial.  Jack Bender had worked for EmpiBank on the outskirts of Charlotte, North Carolina, the so-called Queen City.  He was offered the position of deputy branch manager for EmpiFinancial in The Bronx and he took it. 

            And so it was that Jack Bender parked his Ford Taurus under the towering halogen lights that late-May dawn, fumbling with his keys to open the storefront of EmpiFinancial. 

            It was Jack's custom to come to the office an hour early, alone.  He poured himself a cup of yesterday's cold coffee, slipped into the machine a dry filter-bag and pushed the orange "On" switch.  Jack used this silent hour to review the promissory notes his staff had managed to cajole from South Bronx residents the day before.

            Bertha Watkins had agreed to pay twenty-four percent interest for a $2,500 loan to buy a new bedroom set at the Sicilian Furniture outlet on 161st Street.  Gina had creamed her for credit insurance too.  Two hundred dollars a month, prepaid, to protect a garish canopy bed that EmpiFinancial would never foreclose on because it couldn't be re-sold.  Jack nodded as he reviewed Gina's handiwork.  She was getting more and more vicious, which was just what EmpiFinancial liked in its employees.  Vicious and smiling.  Jack closed his eyes and pictured the closing:

            "This way if you die, Ms. Watkins, you can rest easy that no one will come repo your beautiful new bedroom set.  This protection, this peace of mind, costs only pennies a day."

            Jack chuckled, lighting his first unfiltered cigarette of the day.  Pennies a day was the classic phrasing, impervious to challenges from state attorneys general, or from Bush II's Federal Trade Commission, if for some reason they freaked out and sued.  Any dollar figure was composed of pennies, wasn't it?  EmpiBank's chairman was paid pennies a day -- 63,562,600 pennies a day, to be precise.  Jack has calculated it.  $232 million a year, all told.  Divide by 365, multiply by a hundred and you had it.  Jack was lighting his second cigarette of the day when Gina came in, her shoulder-length hair not as neat as usual.

            "Gina, baby," Jack said, standing up from his desk.  "I like the way you reamed this Bertha Watkins.  The credit insurance on the bed? It's priceless."

            Gina smiled but inside she cringed.  This all wasn't what she'd expected when she'd paid to attend EmpiFinancial's seminar at the Courtyard by Marriott conference center by LaGuardia Airport.  "The sky's the limit," the trainer had said.  "You'll be sellin' a good product -- always remember that we have a product that people want -- and you'll be getting EmpiBank stock options that have never decreased in value.  Never!"  The trainer jangled his gold Rolex watch -- Patek Philippe, perhaps: from the audience it was hard to see -- and clicked to the next slide of his PowerPoint presentation.  How after a year selling personal loans EmpiFinancial would train them down at its corporate campus in Baltimore to take the Series Seven, so they could pitch variable annuities to retirees.  "You'll be workin' for Wall Street," the trainer said.  "The sky's the limit."

            That EmpiBank was based on Anguilla -- to Gina it sounded like a kind of lizard -- was not explained.  Gina figured it was just smart tax planning.  Who wanted to work for a company that was a sucker for the government anyway?   If they didn't know how to manage their own money, what would they pay you with?   Gina answered Jack without looking at him too closely.  "We can flip her in a month," she said, going to the coffee station and filling her cup.  "There's no way she can afford the monthly payments.  She'll be back in here before summer's out and we can rip her on the refinance too."

     "That's my girl," Jack said.   Gina left the coffee station without putting in the non-dairy creamer.  She didn't want Jack to get within five feet of her. The sky was the limit..

            Somewhere Micah Levine was thinking: bait and switch.  Actually Micah was picking a jury on 161st Street and the Grand Concourse, just eight blocks west, in the case of a baby whose forehead was pierced with forceps by a Filipino doctor-trainee who'd worked forty hours straight -- but that's another story, for later.

* * *

Elizabeth or the Apocalypse

In Midtown Tom Bain watched or played at watching the Bloomberg machine because that was his job.  He was a stock analyst whose beat was the euphemistically-named field of "specialty finance," otherwise known as subprime lending or, less politely, loan-sharking.  Bain tracked publicly-traded loan sharks and issued research reports on their future prospects under different interest-rate scenarios.  Bain had concluded that the Federal Reserve's interest rate moves had little impact on the loan-sharking field.  The customers were not, the catch-phrase went, "interest rate sensitive."  In his off-hours Bain didn't attend to the Wall Street niceties: the subprime customers were desperate, or ignorant;  in any event, they didn't rush out to refinance when the Fed lowered rates, as it did after the September 2001 plane-bombing of the World Trade Center.  Bain had used to work there, across the street from the Towers in Seven World Trade. 

The building didn't get hit by a plane but it collapsed nonetheless.  By then Bain was in his studio apartment in Battery Park City, watching the chaos and breathing the dust.  He drank three six packs of beer that day, and now had gone back to smoking pot, taking crystal meth and ecstasy, partying away the few hours he was not glued to his Bloomberg screen.  Occasionally he thought about his girlfriend from college, who hadn't cared about money at all -- she read Emily Dickinson for fun, for God's sake.  She'd gotten married then divorced and now lived in Greenwich, Connecticut.  Once a week or so Tom thought about calling her and trying to revive things.  But it was probably too late.  He was at the tail end of being a young Turk and it was already too late.

Sometimes Tom took crystal meth at lunchtime.  Maybe al-Qaida would blow the whole thing up, the whole island or the whole country, and none of it would matter anymore.  For now he analyzed EmpiFinancial's tracking stock, breaking out its fundamentals from those of its EmpiGroup parent, and issued reports touting its business model as positively Darwinistic.  His college girlfriend would have liked that phrasing.  And so again he thought of calling her.  Anything to avoid ending again at midnight standing naked in front of the plate glass window of his living room waiting for al-Qaida's planes to give his life meaning.

This afternoon, though, he couldn't get naked, couldn't take drugs, had to put on his tie and squint his eyes like any other Midtown wolf.  Empi's chairman was presenting, as they called it, at the Securities Industry Association's 21st Annual conglomerates conference.  They'd be a Q&A and Bain was expected to ask a question about EmpiFinancial, whether the same model could work equally overseas as it did in the United States.  Maybe Bain would get to take a trip to kick the tires of Empi's 200 percent interest rate loans on bicycles in India.  Bain traveled three or four times a month, always first class.  Since "The Event," he'd gone to Birmingham, Alabama, to spot-check AmSouth Bank's home equity loan portfolio and meet -- which meant drink with -- its risk-management staff.  He'd gone to Charlotte, North Carolina, where he snorted six lines of coke in an absurd skyscraper with a guy who issued lines of credit to payday lenders.  He'd interviewed a wannabe loan-shark in Cincinnati, who spent half his time ranting about riots and ingrates and Over-the-Rhine.  Pittsburgh, where you could smoke in the airport and the steel industry had apparently entirely disappeared.  His next step was Southern California, where many loan sharks liked to put their headquarters, million dollar faux Mediterranean villas with home-offices with maps full of pushpins on the wall.  Maybe he'd do some surfing, in the three-foot waves of Laguna Beach.  But now he had to mock-grill Empi's chairman, issue a glowing report and then get high.

Since the collapse of Seven World Trade Bain had been working out of temporary digs in one of the dozen faceless office blocks on Park Avenue north of Grand Central Station.  The street was wide and filled with well-tailored despair.  The SIA conference was in the amphitheater of the building that used to be Bankers Trust, before BT got taken over and most key functions moved to Frankfurt.  Globalization cut both ways -- witness EmpiGroup's tax-dodge shift to Anguilla.  Empi's chairman Sandy Vyle spent three months a year down there, getting as sun-burnt as a blood-red beach ball.  He must have just returned, because up on the stage, standing alone at the podium with a white wall behind him, he looked to be on fire.  Vyle wore a bright yellow tie and one half-expected him to pull a tropical drink out from under the podium, a daiquiri with a turquoise paper umbrella, some houseboys and a native girl physical therapist.  Vyle was bioviating about EBIDA -- Earnings Before Interest, Depreciation and Amortization -- as Bain walked in.   Tax wasn't mentioned; taxes had been evaded a long time ago.  Bain hadn't missed much.  He found a seat near the front and loosened his tie so he could speak when the moment came.

Vyle had supposedly named a successor but he still ran the show.  He thought he would live forever and perhaps that had been arranged down on Anguilla.  Maybe he was video-taping corporate pep-talks for the next decade, doing an as-told-to memoir with some sycophant journalist, buying spare organs in Chile and keeping them on ice.  In business school, Vyle was all that Bain had wanted to be: the hard-charging Brooklyn-born hard-lender who now ruled Wall Street from a tropical tax haven.  Now Bain no longer knew what he wanted to be when or if he grew up. He'd worked on a boat one summer;  he supposed he could do it again if al-Qaida destroyed his nest egg's value.

On stage, Vyle was racing through the consumer finance numbers.  Delinquency rates had been stemmed, Vyle said, and more and more sales finance contracts were being converted into home equity loans, the hammer of the threat of foreclosure, the very definition of having them by the balls.  Bain jotted down the phrase about sale finance conversions. When the Q&A came, Bain asked a question.  Some in the audience laughed, that the supposedly-expert analyst didn't know this basic scam.

"I'm glad you asked, Tom," Vyle said, smiling hearty and false.  Vyle had a photographic memory for the stock analysts who covered Empi: he knew where they lived, and you knew what that meant.  "These are, you know, private label cards, loans made through retailers, all at twenty-plus-percent interest but what's most promising is our demonstrated ability to convert these loans into liens, to lower the rates slightly in exchange for a mortgage on the borrower's house."  Vyle smiled contentedly. 

Bain's face was turning red; he regretted now asking such a rudimentary question in this public forum.  So he tried to make it seem like a set-up: "But how can you include in next year's projections this same rate of conversion?  With the economic slow-down eventually the pool of home equity will be--"

"It's all explained in the footnotes," Vyle cut in.  "We've stress-tested our model under more than sixty-four scenarios.  I'd happy to speak with you off-line, Tom."

"That'd be--"   But Vyle had already pointed to the next questioner.  And soon Bain would be high and naked, waiting for Elizabeth or the Apocalypse.

End of section - More of this sample chapter is available on http://www.innercitypress.org

Predatory Lending

Toxic Credit in the Global Inner City

An Afterword to Predatory Bender: A Novel of Subprime Finance

One: This is How It Works

            Borrowing money is a way of life and death.  To buy a home or start a small business, to build a dam or fight a war: it all requires finance.  It is doled out by banks and their casino called Wall Street.  In alleyways from The Bronx to Beijing there are loan sharks as well, offering fast cash and then collecting with baseball bats and foreclosures.  That the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund do this as well will be explored later.  We start with transactions in their simplest form: two thousand dollars, say, to buy needed household goods.

            In the United States in the first decade of the 21st century there are many storefronts offering such loans.  Some are old -- Household Finance and its sister Beneficial, for example -- and some are newer-fangled, like CitiFinancial.  Both offer credit at rates over thirty percent.  The business is booming: the spreads, Wall Street says, are too good to pass up.  Citibank pays under five percent interest on the deposits it collects.  Its affiliated loan sharks charge four times that rate, even for loans secured by the borrower's home.  It's a can't-miss proposition.  Even if the economy goes South they can take and resell the collateral.  The business is global: the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, now HSBC, wants to export it to the eighty-plus countries in which it has a retail presence.  Institutional investors love the business model and investment banks securitize the loans.  These fancy terms will be defined as we proceed.

            The root, however, the fodder on which the whole pyramid rests, is the solitary customer at what's called the point of sale.  It's a magic trick, really, perhaps a form of bad religion, the way the points and fees can be added to the money that's lent.  CitiFinancial and Household Finance both suggest that insurance is needed.  This they serve in a number of flavors -- credit life and credit disability, credit unemployment and property insurance -- but in almost all cases, it is included in the loans and interest is charged on it.  It's called "single premium" -- instead of paying each month for coverage, you pay in advance with money on which you pay interest.  If you choose to refinance, you will not get a refund.  It is money down the drain, but at the point-of-sale it often goes unnoticed.

            Take, for example, the purchase of furniture.  A bedroom set might cost two thousand dollars.  The sign says Easy Credit, sometimes spelled E-Z.  The furniture man does not manage these accounts.  For this he turns to CitiFinancial, to HFC or perhaps to Wells Fargo.  While the Federal Reserve lends money to banks at below five percent, these bank-affiliates charge twenty or thirty or forty percent.  You will have insurance on your furniture: to protect you, they say, from having it repossessed if you die or become unemployed.  Before the debt is discharged, dead or alive, you will have paid more than the list-price of a luxury car or a crypt with a doorman.

Midway you'll be approached with a sweet-sounding offer: if you'll put up your home as collateral, your rate can be lowered and the term be extended.  A twenty-year mortgage, fixed or adjustable.  The rate will be high and the rules not disclosed.  For example: if you satisfy the loan too quickly, you'll be charged a pre-payment penalty.  Or, you'll pay slowly and then be asked to pay more, in what's called a balloon.  If you can't, that's okay: they knew you couldn't.  The goal is to refinance your loan and charge you yet more points and fees.

If it's a regulated business, where then are the regulators?  One of them's the same cabal which sets the rates: the Federal Reserve.  The Fed has jurisdiction over all bank holding companies, including Citigroup, Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo.  Each owns a subprime lender.  Bank of America, among other things, underwrites the predatory loans. But the Fed, at least under Greenspan, has had its eye on bigger, more ideological quarry.   And so there are, of course, non-federal opponents.  Consumer watchdogs and community-based groups, and, seemingly in a different sphere, class action lawyers. State attorneys general also play a role: just prior to HSBC's bear hug, Household International settled with states for half a billion dollars.  Citigroup, given the political juice it enjoys, paid half that amount, to six times the victims.  These settlements, in the language of Wall Street, are a cost of doing business.  At most, Citigroup pays back sixty cents on each dollar it stole.  In exchange it gets a waiver: the people accepting the settlement checks cannot sue Citi again. 

            While this may sound like organized crime, that is not how it's put at the time of recruitment.  To get their employees, the CitiFinancials and HFCs of the world don't say "come and be predatory."  Citi for example says, come get on the train before it leaves the station.  You will work for Sandy Weill.  He has always doubled money; why should it now be different?  The hardest-chargers are given a dream: one day they too can sell stocks. It's a form of religion: heaven re-branded as economic freedom..  From loan shark to Wall Street: that is the trajectory.  That and a journey to the East:  the 21st century, it is said, will belong to Asia.  And there the predatory lenders will be.  They salivate to enter China, with its one billion pawns, its mud-brick homes to lend against.  Citigroup buys five percent of a bank; HSBC has already got eight.  Soon it will be all for sale.  And so there the watchers must go.  From Sichuan and back; from Xinjiang and New Zealand.  The revolving door between the industry and its regulators; the sick flow of money that can still now buy elections -- all of it must change.  New songs, new plays, new forms.  New ways to bottle wine, and also to sell it.  Or to give it away...

A Note on Sources

"And so there the watchers must go" -- see, e.g., Hong Kong Standard, April 29, 2003, "Advocacy Group Tries to Stop [HSBC-] AMP Deal."  See also, Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2002, "HSBC Sets $16 Billion Deal for Household International;"  Financial Times, April 4, 2003, Pg. 18, "Big Lenders Forced to Bank on 'Untouchables' of the Past."  See also, Newsday, April 16, 2003, Pg. A51, "Activists [at] Citigroup Meeting." On redlining, see ABC News Nightline, April 10, 1995, Transcript # 3621: The Community Reinvestment Act [and Inner City Press/Community on the Move’s advocacy work in the Bronx]; Newsday, November 30, 1994, Pg. A32, "About Banks and The Bronx: Fair is Fair."

 For a less cryptic (and more global) approach, see "Community Reinvestment in a Globalizing World: To Hold Banks Accountable, From The Bronx to Buenos Aires, Beijing and Basle," by Matthew Lee, in Organizing Access to Capital: Advocacy and the Democratization of Financial Institutions, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003; another chapter, on international predatory lending, is forthcoming from Praeger. 

End of sample -  Longer excerpts are available at http://www.innercitypress.org

 

 

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